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Abstract: While the notion of the Anthropocene has generated a great deal of literature 
across disciplines, the geographic critique of this concept is still developing. This paper 
contributes to justice-oriented engagements with the Anthropocene by highlighting the 
relationships through which planetary knowledge is constructed as sites of critique. I 
develop an analytic of 'synoptic geographies,' which addresses the praxis of coordinated 
field measurements that creates the planetary knowledge upon which concepts of the 
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Anthropocene rest. Synoptic geographies require a geographic analytic that is capable of 
going beyond assertions that all knowledge is local. The International Geophysical Year 
(1957-1958) provides a strategic opportunity to elaborate the stakes of synoptic 
geographies. The IGY was arguably the first attempt to understand the Earth as a planet 
through a program of widespread synoptic data collection. In particular, the synoptic 
geographies of the IGY's oceanography program reveal the ways in which old and new 
forms of imperialism were knitted together to produce the world ocean as an object of 
knowledge in a new era of planet-scale environmental politics. 
 
INTRODUCTION: KNOWING A PLANETARY OCEAN 
Welcoming visitors to the Sant Ocean Hall, the Smithsonian Museum of Natural 
History’s largest permanent exhibit, a sign reads: “The ocean is a global system essential 
to all life – including yours.” This is but one example of a view of the ocean, as one 
dynamic entity with profound significance for life on Earth, that undergirds contemporary 
understandings of climate change, and even, arguably, 21st century environmental politics 
writ large. But this ocean is not self-evident or ‘natural’; just as no one lives in the global 
climate, no one directly experiences a global ocean (Edwards 2010). The ocean is local, 
even intensely so, at every point of embodied experience. Yet it is also increasingly 
known as global, even planetary, and the ocean’s capacity to move, change, and create 
effects on a planetary scale appears vital to its very nature. Moreover, this planetary 
notion of the ocean fundamentally underlies the environmental politics of the present.  
The idea of the Anthropocene, or even alternatives such as Gaia, fundamentally 
rests upon the ability to conceptualize the Earth as a planet; to think planetary-scale 
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dynamics and environments; to envision the Earth as one coherent self-regulating system 
(see Latour 2017; Stengers 2015). For scientists, it is not enough to envision global- or 
planetary-scale environments; they also must measure and monitor them. This need 
characterizes the entire complex of Earth System Sciences, including oceanography, 
glaciology, atmospheric sciences, geology, and even those recently brought under this 
umbrella, such as ecology. Understanding the geographies brought about by the 
production of planetary knowledge can further critiques of the Anthropocene. Moreover, 
geographers ought to pay more attention to the production of planetary knowledge for at 
least two additional reasons. First, geographers across the discipline are frequently 
responsible for making global knowledge. Second, as scholars in Science and 
Technology Studies, and increasingly geography point out, these practices do not just 
make representations of the world, they make worlds. They put different bodies, 
technologies, ideologies, and materials into relation and in so doing they create 
heterogeneous spatialities and sites (Powell 2007). The “data friction” involved in 
making planetary knowledge sets into motion entire chains of relations and elevates 
certain sites into positions of prominence in the Anthropocene discourse (Edwards 2010).  
This paper develops an analysis of “synoptic geographies,” defined as set of 
coordinated data practices common to many field sciences, and the planetary view that 
results. The synoptic approach “starts with the observation of data and then continues 
with the preparation of a concise description, i.e. a ‘synopsis’” (Pickard and Emery 1990, 
4). Crucially, the emphasis of synoptic sciences, the raw materials with which they draw 
conclusions, are observational data, today usually gathered by a combination of in situ 
and remote sensors. Synoptic geographies, then, contain elements of the “view from 
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nowhere,” as well as grounded attempts to grid and abstract the Earth, although they 
cannot be reduced to either (see Haraway, 1988, Shapin 1998). Neither conceptual 
abstraction nor remote technological operation, synoptic geographies operate inductively, 
linking distant places through careful coordination to produce coherent and quantifiable 
understandings of the Earth as a planet. While geographers of science have begun to 
understand the ways in which ‘the field’ influences science and science influences ‘the 
field’ (see Fleming 2014), synoptic geographies thus compel us to ask what happens 
when ‘the field’ is not a discrete location but the planet? In considering the specific 
geographies involved in knowing the planet as such, this paper responds to calls to 
consider the heterogeneous spatialities of climate change and related dimensions of 
contemporary environmental politics (e.g. Mahoney and Hulme 2006; Edwards 2010). 
Moreover, it attempts to demonstrate how a geographic analytic of synoptic geographies 
can strengthen critiques of the Anthropocene discourse.  
 This study examines a paradigmatic instance of synoptic science in the practices 
of the International Geophysical Year (1957-58), a global geophysics program that 
involved scientists and amateurs from over fifty nations and sought to produce 
comprehensive knowledge about the whole of the liquid, solid, and gaseous Earth. While 
the IGY was not the first instance of synoptic science, it “altered the course of science” 
due not only to the foundational geophysical data collected but also to the paradigm of 
‘big science’ that it initiated (Hampton et al. 2013, 157; Lövbrand, Stripple, and Wiman 
2009). The main goal of the IGY was “to collect synoptic data in many fields” (Hamblin 
2005, 66). Yet despite its immense influence on many of the sciences (and worldviews) 
that are most relevant today, the IGY has received little academic attention, and when it 
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is mentioned it tends to be as part of a genealogy of other phenomena; for example, as a 
key moment in the space race (Launius 2010). In geography, Collis and Dodds (2008) 
have provided arguably the deepest analysis of the IGY, but their work devotes little 
attention to the science itself, instead engaging with the legal geographies, science-
military relationships, and public media of the project. The IGY deserves geographic 
attention on these topics, but perhaps even more fundamentally due to its legacies for 
contemporary environmental epistemologies; it not only hastened the development of 
every geophysical science involved but also “inspired the build-up of numerical models 
attempting to capture, on a grand-scale level, basic feedbacks between human society and 
the global environment,” from the pioneering world-systems models of the 1970s to the 
Earth Systems models of today (Lövbrand, Stripple, and Wiman 2009, 9; Doel 2003). 
I focus here particularly on the oceanography program, which exemplified the 
IGY’s guiding aims and principle challenges, and played a significant role in new 
conceptions of the Earth as characterized by planetary-scale dynamics. Therefore, the 
IGY oceanography program is more than a convenient example of synoptic geographies. 
The ocean is increasingly recognized as a key Anthropocene environment. Not only, for 
example, do Zalasiewicz and colleagues (2008) list ocean changes as key indicators of 
the Anthropocene, but the ocean has shifted in a range of fields from being understood as 
a “void to a plenum,” now at the center of many of the social and natural processes that 
define the current era (Oreskes 2014, 384). Geographers, too numerous to cite here, have 
begun to take renewed interest in the sea (but see for example Anderson and Peters 2014; 
Steinberg and Peters 2015). Nonetheless, the ways in which we have come to understand 
this crucial environment have been underexamined in the history of science, much less 
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geography (Oreskes 2014). It remains beyond the scope of this paper to fully detail the 
developments in oceanography that preceded and developed from the IGY; instead, I 
focus mainly on the project’s two-fold program: a globe-spanning set of oceanographic 
expeditions, as well as coordinated measurements from a dispersed network of sensors to 
create the most comprehensive dataset to date on planetary-scale phenomena such as 
tides, currents, and long waves. It does, however, bear mentioning that specific datasets 
and technologies developed during the IGY oceanographic program still play important 
roles in today’s evolving understandings of the ocean’s role in climate. For example, the 
float design central to the Argo project, arguably the most important program for ocean 
climate data, is based on the IGY’s Swallow floats (Lehman, 2016). Moreover, as 
Lövbrand, Stripple, and Wiman assert, IGY data practices “paved the way” for the 
integrated models that inform contemporary analysis of the feedbacks between ocean, 
atmosphere, and land at the center of climate science debates (2009, 9).  
This paper begins by elucidating some of the stakes of synoptic geographies by 
linking them to debates about planetary knowledge and politics that have recently 
emerged in geography, particularly with the advent of the Anthropocene concept. Here, I 
argue that critiques of the Anthropocene, and even of the planetary, have tended to 
overlook the processes by which we come to know the planet as such. Moreover, I argue 
that although the claim common to geographies of science that all scientific practices are 
always locally situated remains relevant, new strategies are needed to account for the way 
in which the planet has emerged as an object of scientific knowledge, and consequently 
governance, for humanity as a whole. I then apply a geographic analytic to the synoptic 
praxis of the IGY, first by examining the structuring ideology and organization of the 
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project and then delving into the oceanographic program in particular. Specifically, this 
analysis reveals how the IGY’s oceanography program brought together old and new 
forms of imperialism to produce inductive knowledge about planetary-scale ocean 
dynamics. The article concludes with some additional thoughts on what a geographic 
analysis of synoptic science might add to developing critiques of the Anthropocene that 
highlight justice dimensions.  
PLANETARY KNOWLEDGE, SYNOPTIC SCIENCES 
A conception of the Earth as a planet fundamentally underlies notions of the 
Anthropocene. The planet is an integrative concept, bringing together human and 
nonhuman, biotic, geologic, and social domains, to envision “a single system, comprising 
a series of ‘coupled’ ‘spheres’ characterized by boundaries, tipping points, feedback 
loops and other forms of nonlinear dynamics” (Lorimer 2017, 119). Thus, planetary 
thought offers something important to human geographers seeking to move past debates 
about the nature/culture division. The planetary also reinvigorates macro-scale analysis 
for the environmental concerns of the 21st century, and arguably after the waning of the 
concept of the global. As Rowan writes, “[w]hereas ‘the global’ suggests a relatively flat, 
anthropocentric conception of the Earth focused on the construction of social relations on 
the surface, ‘the planetary’, by contrast, points to a more complex, volumic, stratified 
understanding of an Earth constituted through dynamic geo-social entanglements” (2014, 
447). Like all environmental concepts, the planetary involves specific configurations of 
both knowledge and power. Litfin describes the planetary as engendering a politics 
concerned with “a distinctive set of dynamics: complex linkages between the local and 
the global; the necessity and inherent difficulty of North-South cooperation; 
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intergenerational time horizons which are typically articulated on the basis of scientific 
models; a strong tendency towards a holistic understanding of the Earth’s systems; and an 
incremental institutionalization of the precautionary principle” (2008, 470). These 
dynamics are inseparable from the sciences that facilitate to our capacity to imagine them 
to begin with.  
Earth Systems Science (ESS), a mega-discipline emerging under this name in the 
1990s and culminating until now in the Future Earth project, is absolutely essential to 
Western ideas of the planetary. Hamilton (2016, 94) describes ESS as a “transdisciplinary 
and holistic approach integrating earth sciences and life sciences, as well as the 
‘industrial metabolism’ of humankind, all within a systems way of thinking, with special 
focus on the non-linear dynamics of a system.” He argues that ESS is truly revolutionary, 
a “rupture” in thought, and analyses of the Anthropocene that fail to take this into account 
risk mischaracterizing its significance. ESS has become the dominant paradigm for global 
environmental change research. It also underlies the extremely influential ‘planetary 
boundaries’ agenda, which provisionally defines a “safe operating space for humanity” 
by identifying “the vital Earth system processes and their dynamic interactions at local, 
regional and global scales and proposes boundary levels which avoid key tipping points 
or biophysical thresholds” (Brown 2017, 119-120; see also Rockström et al. 2009). If the 
Anthropocene authorizes new forms of knowledge, the success of the planetary 
boundaries framework and related ideas indicates that planetary knowledge is surely at 
the forefront (Braun 2014). 
Geographers have critiqued the implications of ESS and planetary politics more 
broadly. While the tendencies that Litfin lists for planetary politics seem neutral, perhaps 
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even desirable, Brown (2017) points out that planetary politics are often associated with a 
kind of top-down global managerialism. Collard, Dempsey, and Sundberg (2015) argue 
that the emphasis on limits in the planetary boundaries framework is incompatible with 
indigenous ontologies focused on abundance and flourishing. Perhaps the most pervasive 
critique of planetary knowledge addresses its scalar ambition, “which erases geographical 
and cultural difference” and precludes other ways of knowing (Hulme 2010, 559). 
Castree argues that geographers should put notions such as “assemblage, hybridity, and 
posthumanism” toward alternatives to global- or planetary-scale knowledge that are more 
“joined-up” and “actionable” (2015, 310). Similarly, Hulme advocates for a kind of 
“spectral knowledge” that recognizes multiple understandings of nature and is 
contextualized, responsive, and accommodating of “ambiguities, voids and blind spots” 
in contrast to the universal and totalizing tendencies of global or planetary knowledge 
(2010, 563). 
These critiques are of vital importance, and suggest that geographers are aptly 
situated to produce analyses that at least seriously complicate the “species-thought” 
toward which the Anthropocene is perhaps inherently inclined, with significant 
implications for the kind of responses that might be generated (Chakrabarty 2009). And 
yet despite contributions to broad notions of ‘ways of knowing,’ this literature frequently 
leaves obscured the very kinds of knowledge that make Anthropocene thought and 
politics possible; as Castree writes, “relatively few human geographers feel equipped to 
open the ‘black box’ of environmental science” (2014, 470). Additionally, when human 
geographers have dedicated attention to the Anthropocene sciences, they have focused 
mainly on the dating practices of geology, or to some degree on climate science (e.g. 
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Demerrit 2001). Though of obvious importance, these are only a few components of the 
scientific practices that allow us to think the Anthropocene. This paper thus seeks to add 
to constructive critiques of the Anthropocene by inquiring into the conditions of 
possibility for Anthropocene knowledge, and specifically showing how these knowledges 
have been shaped by the forces of imperialism during the Cold War, a formative period 
for the production of planetary thought (Cosgrove 1994).  
Human geography is well-positioned to develop critiques of planetary knowledge 
because the discipline has long paid attention to how scales or references to seemingly 
natural entities bring together power and knowledge to enable certain politics and 
foreclose others (see Castree 2014a; 2014b; 2014c; Randalls 2015). The subfield of 
geographies of science are clearly especially relevant here, as a geographical analysis 
might show what is at stake in the ‘planetary’ of planetary knowledge. More specifically, 
geographies of science may show not simply how science is conducted on a planetary 
scale, but more importantly how “science itself creates spaces and places for its own 
activities and in turn spatializes the world in a wide variety of ways” (Naylor 2005, 3; see 
also Livingstone 1995; Powell 2007). However, synoptic geographies of planetary 
knowledge suggest a shift in emphasis for most geographies of science. Perhaps the 
driving motivation for most geographies of science has been “the replacement of the 
dominant conception of universal rationality with notions of the local geographies of 
knowledge” (Powell 2007, 319-320; see also Mahoney and Hulme 2016). Indeed, many 
geographers of science follow Latour’s 1987 argument that even universal truth claims 
can be ‘localized’ in certain practices that facilitate the mobility, stability, and 
combinability of knowledge. The ‘placelessnes’ of universal knowledge emerges from 
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locally-situated practices (Henke and Gieryn 2008). Planetary knowledge is, of course, 
composed of and given shape by local practices. But it is my contention that without 
attending to the ways in which synoptic geographies are coordinated on a global scale, 
we risk missing key dynamics of planetary knowledge. In the case I explore here, these 
dynamics entail how imperialism, inflected by Cold War geopolitics, has been vital to the 
production of planetary nature. Thus, the globe or the planet is crucially more than the 
context in which local practices are carried out (Naylor, 2005). It is also more than that to 
which data practices must be applied, as Edwards (2010) might suggest. It is itself shaped 
by the praxis of synoptic science. 
 The challenge for geographies of science to move beyond the localizing impulse 
in order to understand the dynamics of planetary knowledge is mirrored, to some degree, 
in social studies of science more broadly. Some scholars of science and technology have 
certainly analyzed ‘big sciences’ such as astronomy, cartography, and big data 
computing. Nonetheless, the social studies of science that have gained traction, especially 
across disciplines, have tended to emphasize what Harris (2011) calls ‘small science,’ 
typically found in disciplines such as biology, anatomy, and other experimental or lab-
based sciences. Here, we can think of the laboratory studies of Latour and others that 
have been very influential in geography (see for example Latour and Woolgar 1986; 
Latour 1987; Callon 1984). Harris argues that these narratives of science often emphasize 
“the work of just a few people working over a short period of time in a restricted 
geographical setting” (2011, 76). Harris links the tendency to focus on small sciences 
with popular assertions that all global knowledge can be localized, and with a somewhat 
ironic tendency of both heterodox and unconventional studies to focus on a limited 
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number of influential technologies, theoretical ‘discoveries,’ and the “biographies of a 
handful of great men” (Harris 2011, 77). By contrast, the study of synoptic sciences, 
which operate in uncontrolled field conditions and entail the labor of many disparate 
actors, poses methodological challenges similar to those that Harris proposes for the 
study of ‘big science.’ How do we employ “both an epistemology and a narrative format 
capable of moving across scale?” (Harris 2011, 79). How can we grasp the “diffuse 
discoveries and communal labor characteristic of the big sciences?” (Harris 2011, 80). 
How can we understand the planetary not as ‘placeless’ but as a place that emerges from 
specific scientific practices? (Henke and Gieryn 2008). What form must our analysis take 
if the ‘place’ is the planet? 
 Arguably the most thorough analysis of synoptic geographies to date can be found 
in the work of Paul Edwards, especially his 2010 study of the history of climate 
modelling, A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global 
Warming. In building an understanding of the knowledge necessary to make claims that 
the climate is changing, Edwards develops a sophisticated analysis of what he calls 
“global knowledge infrastructures,” and the challenges to creating them, through a 
historically detailed account of global meteorology. In particular, his sustained attention 
to what it takes to make global data/make data global, both in everyday praxis and in the 
creation of lasting systems, greatly informs my efforts here. Where this paper diverges 
from Edwards’ work is not simply in its focus on oceanography rather than meteorology; 
with a much more limited scope, this article also highlights especially the relationships 
between emerging planetary knowledge and imperialism that might be elucidated by a 
geographic analysis of synoptic science. Moreover, while his notions of “making global 
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data” and “making data global” are immediately relevant, I see the globe or the planet not 
as a pre-given space to be ‘filled in’ with data but something that emerges from synoptic 
praxis itself.  
In this paper, it will be evident that developing an analytic for synoptic 
geographies facilitates an analysis of planetary knowledge that might resist the cultures of 
“scientific heroism” that credit advances to a few charismatic individuals (usually white 
men) (Oreskes 1996).  Further, a geographic analysis of synoptic science might advance 
postcolonial aims, drawing emphasis away from the established centers of scientific 
discovery and indicating global dynamics of power and knowledge tightly woven with 
capitalism and imperialism. As Redfield (2002) argues, a methodological approach that 
treats all knowledge practices as equally ‘local’ may miss the politics that make some 
places and practices not simply appear as ‘more’ local but also subjects them to the 
violences of imperialism and colonialism. By analysing the synoptic relations that shaped 
the IGY, and hence our knowledge of the Earth as a planetary system, I argue that the 
geopolitical conditions and everyday relations of synoptic science can inform critiques of 
the Anthropocene that seek not only to unpack its notions of ‘nature’ but to highlight 
dimensions of justice and historic processes of imperialism and violence. 
PLANETARY KNOWLEDGE AND THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR 
The IGY was catalyzed by both the anxieties and possibilities of the postwar era, from 
the fears of nuclearism to the potentials of international collaboration in the promised 
new era of peace and prosperity. Initially conceived as a follow-up to the International 
Polar Years of 1882-1883 and 1932-1933, the remit of the IGY was soon expanded as 
“science had raced far ahead with new discoveries, and [these] had spawned scores of 
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complex problems related not to the polar regions alone but to the entire Earth” (Ross 
1961, 12). The IGY spanned 18 months, July 1 1957-Dec 31 1958, and involved 
scientists from 54 nations as well as a cadre of amateurs, all who were “working on the 
boundaries of their own knowledge of the physical world” (Fraser 1958, xv). The 
geophysical realms that were explored in the IGY fell into ten categories, encompassing 
the whole of the liquid, solid, and gaseous Earth: meteorology, oceanography, glaciology, 
ionospheric physics, the aurora, geomagnetism, cosmic rays, seismology, gravity, and 
latitudes and longitudes.  
The driving impetus of the IGY was data collection, and this focus distinguished 
it from contemporaneous ‘big science’ projects, such as the Manhattan Project and the 
space platforms (Aranova, Baker, and Oreskes 2010). The latter were characterized by 
“centralized, large-scale scientific research efforts of unprecedented magnitude” while 
the IGY provided a different model, “distinguished by its emphasis on and the visibility 
of Big Data—a synoptic collection of observational data on a global geographic scale” 
(Aronova, Baker, and Oreskes 2010, 185). Although it was perhaps the last international 
scientific project that was not fundamentally influenced by computational data processing 
and modeling, the IGY “marked a dramatic transition” to “a more permanent 
infrastructural globalism” for scientific data (Edwards 2010, 207). Early in the IGY 
planning process, organizers decided that all data collected was to be freely circulated. As 
Lövbrand, Stripple, and Wiman write, it was not simply the bird’s-eye view of the planet 
from space that inaugurated views of the Earth as a planet during the IGY, but even more, 
“[t]he systematic and global-scale collection of geophysical data during this year, and the 
growing technological capacity of storing and processing such data, paved the way for 
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global biogeochemical and biogeophysical models and their visual representation of an 
integrated planetary environmental system” (Lövbrand, Stripple, and Wiman 2009, 9).  
Three World Data centers were established early in IGY planning: World Data 
Center A in the United States, World Data Center B in Moscow, and World Data Center 
C, consisting of subcenters in eight nations in Western Europe, Japan, and Australia. That 
the World Data Centers fall so neatly along Cold War geopolitical lines certainly 
suggests a situatedness of IGY data that existed in tension with its claims to globality. 
Efforts to bring common or unclaimed spaces under territorial and legal jurisdiction, a 
key outcome of the IGY, hint at some of these tensions. As Collis and Dodds write: 
“On the eve of the IGY, the legal status of the Antarctic, the High Seas, the ocean 
floors and outer space was legally unfixed and largely undefined. By the 1960s, 
this had changed. Three landmark treaties were central to this transformation – the 
1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The IGY was central to this legal and 
geographical transformation” (2008, 559).  
The influence of the IGY on the governance of these spaces, especially perhaps the poles, 
is a topic of great interest (see for example Collis and Stevens 2007; Collis 2010; Launius 
2010) but here it will have to suffice to say that these agreements, informed by the 
process of creating synoptic knowledge during the IGY, not only parceled out parts of 
previously commonly-held spaces for exclusive use by individual nations, they also gave 
increased authority to intergovernmental agencies. The move toward international 
governance is a hallmark of linked legal and ecological management in the 
Anthropocene, as well as a key feature of the broader turn to planetary politics (e.g. Litfin 
2008; Lövbrand, Stripple, and Wiman 2009). This shift should be understood as perhaps 
one of the most influential outcomes of Cold War synoptic geographies.  
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The IGY’s synoptic geographies were tightly tied to certain imaginaries of the 
Earth, and the program thus played a significant role in defining new strategies and goals 
for governance (Lövbrand, Stripple, and Wiman 2009). Perhaps more precisely, synoptic 
science during the IGY, and the methods by which it was produced, both fit into and 
influenced Cold War internationalism and its legacies; Doel goes so far as to call the IGY 
“the development that most illustrated the link between geophysics and the power of the 
state” (2003, 647). There is, of course, much to say about science, spatiality, and 
internationalism in the Cold War, most of it beyond the scope of this paper (see instead 
Hamblin 2005; Barnes and Farish 2008; Farish 2010; Edwards 2010; Mirowski 2002). 
Farish (2010) argues that the Cold War should be understood spatially, not just 
historically. He shows how the scales of globe, region, continent, and city were given 
collective and strategic definition not simply through conflict between global 
superpowers but also in the less binarized, more complex geopolitics of the era. When it 
comes to science specifically, East-West tensions, especially between the US and Russia, 
“stimulated public patronage for research that was sustained and massive,” and 
ideological battles and military interests certainly shaped science at many scales (Solovey 
2001, 165). Yet as Edwards (2010) stresses, scientific internationalism during the Cold 
War was not simply a cover for nationalistic strategy. As he writes, “as a contest between 
ideologies and social systems, the Cold War demanded that nations prove their 
commitments to peace, scientific progress, and the improvement of everyday life” (2010, 
224).  For scientists, transcending national borders was nothing new, though many such 
endeavors had been interrupted by World War II. In the postwar period, many “simply 
wanted to continue their traditional internationalism and openness” (Edwards 2010, 224; 
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see also Hamblin 2005). Cosgrove, following Tenbruch, uses the term “one-worldism” to 
describe some of these tensions (1994). For Cosgrove, the turn to images of the globe and 
notions of universal human benefit are expressions of a postwar form of American 
imperialism, which emphasizes “spatial and social incorporation rather [than] direct 
imperial domination” (Cosgrove 1994, 281). Ideas of global harmony and the pursuit of 
universal planetary knowledge, propagated by the US but also by US-led institutions like 
the United Nations, carried a thinly veiled assumption that the United States would be the 
technical and political leader of such a world, counter-posed to Soviet territoriality. IGY 
literature clearly aligns with this ideology, positing the program as a kind of post-political 
exploration, a sort of adventure not for political but for scientific ends. President 
Eisenhower’s words at the start of the IGY reflect as much: “As I see it, [...] the most 
important result of the International Geophysical Year is the demonstration of the ability 
of peoples of all nations to work together harmoniously for the common good. I hope this 
can become common practice in other forms of human endeavor.”1 Science writer Ronald 
Fraser puts it thus:  
“The high aim of the IGY effort, in short, is not technical but scientific. It is the 
first concerted world-wide attack by man on the mysteries of his own 
environment. It would be surprising if it were the last. This key feature of the 
enterprise cannot be emphasized too strongly. The urge which has led scientists of 
54 nations to install their instruments on ice floes in the Arctic, on remote islands 
in the Pacific, on high peaks in the Andes, in the frozen wastes of Antarctica, is 
not an urge to discover new lands, or to blaze new geographical trails. It is an urge 
to a new kind of adventure - the scientific exploration of the earth as a planet” 
(Fraser 1958, 24). 
                                                 
1 Remarks by the president in connection with the opening of the International 
Geophysical Year; International Geophysical Year 6/30/57; Dwight. D. Eisenhower 
National Archive, Abilene, KS. 
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This planetary-view discourse takes visual form in Figure 1, showing US IGY committee 
chairman gazing at a transparent model of the planet and its environment.  
Resonating strongly with one-worldism, an emphasis on studying the Earth as a 
planet was the code of entry and ultimate signature of the IGY. To participate in IGY, 
national programs had to show that their efforts were aimed at understanding the Earth as 
a planet: “In a sense, the IGY was a scientific club. To gain admittance - that is, to be 
included in the IGY program - a scientific project had to be concerned with 'specific 
planetary problems of the earth'” (Sullivan 1959). As the Canadian geophysicist J. Tuzo 
Wilson put it, one of the IGY’s principle achievements was “the transformation of earth 
science into planetary science” (Wilson 1961, 320). In another example, Ross states that 
among IGY’s distinctive features, “first and foremost was the fact that it used the earth 
and the enveloping world of space as a gigantic laboratory. These areas, together with the 
sun, were observed and studied as never before by scientists working on an international 
co-operative basis” (Ross 1961, 7).  
Language of one-worldism occluded not only Cold War tensions but also other 
inequalities in IGY participation. While literature on the participation of the colonized 
and decolonizing world is scant, one report, titled “The International Geophysical Year in 
Africa South of the Sahara,” prepared by S.P. Jackson, the “Interafrican Scientific 
Correspondent for Climatology,” provides a small window into IGY activities in the 
colonized world.2  Jackson evaluates the IGY plans of various countries by grouping 
them by their colonial overseers. He writes that while “the French and Belgian 
                                                 
2 Jackson, S.P. The International Geophysical Year in Africa South of the Sahara. 
Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara. National Library 
of South Africa. 
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programmes in Africa have been carefully planned and adequately financed,” the story in 
the British territories is different: “there were strong expressions of frustration and 
disappointment - no additional funds have been voted for even relatively inexpensive 
equipment and the costs of participation in the programme of the International 
Geophysical Year will have to be met out of already overstrained budgets for ordinary 
work.”3 Moreover, he writes, the arrangement of the IGY programs in Africa “has some 
disadvantages from the point of view of African science; there has been very little 
discussion of plans between neighbouring territories and no co-ordination except in the 
field of meteorology.” As for meteorology, Edwards writes that decolonization that was 
occurring concurrently with the IGY “created a crisis for data collection as 
meteorological services once supported by far-flung colonial empires fell under the 
precarious management of emerging nations much less committed to the project of 
infrastructural globalism” (2010, 206).  
 If Jackson’s report indicates some of the general woes of IGY research in the 
global South, then the oceanography program provides a more precise bellwether. 
Although 36 nations participated in IGY oceanographic research, only three of these were 
African nations (compared with six South/Central American, seven Asian, 15 European, 
as well as the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USSR). Moreover, South 
Africa, which, though still under Apartheid rule, had become independent from the 
United Kingdom 20 years prior, was the only African nation to have a program that 
involved research cruises as opposed to simply the maintenance of tide and sea-level 
gauges.  
                                                 
3 Ibid., 3. 
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Already we can see that synoptic geographies entail not just uneven data coverage 
of the globe, but also unequal geopolitical relationships, serving to further scientific 
expertise and in some geographic areas and not others while at the same time creating a 
notion of the planet as an object of knowledge for all of humanity. But to more deeply 
understand how imperial relations and social difference were elided in producing a global 
environment, we must look in greater detail at the coordinated measurements that 
comprised the oceanographic program of the IGY. Through this examination we can see 
how geopolitical and imperial power is expressed in, and emerges from, these synoptic 
geographies. 
A PLANETARY SEA: THE IGY OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM 
The IGY oceanographic program consisted of two main elements: the study of ocean 
circulation, especially of deep-sea currents, and the measurement of changes in sea level 
and ocean waves. Currents, of course, had been observed throughout the history of 
human engagement with the sea. Scientists knew that they were caused by surface winds 
as well as by the shape of ocean basins, the rotation of the Earth, and differentials in 
temperature and salinity that cause water masses to sink in some places and float to the 
surface in others. Yet, as I discuss further below, the particular mechanisms by which 
these currents function remained unknown, much less quantified. This was certainly not 
simply an academic question; not only do currents affect marine navigation, but they also 
are relevant to environmental concerns that were imminent to the time, such as the 
disposal of nuclear waste, the ocean’s role in climate, and the potential of marine protein 
to feed growing populations. Thus synoptic geographies were called upon to address 
anxieties of socio-environmental catastrophes that transcend territorial and temporal 
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borders; anxieties that link Cold War internationalism to the planetary politics of the 
present.  
 The second part of the IGY oceanography program sought to solve some 
mysteries regarding variations in sea level over both short and long timespans. In 
particular, scientists were interested in explaining seasonal change in sea level, and 
understanding whether observed changes were consistent from place to place. They also 
sought to understand “long waves which travel the whole width of the oceans” (Laclavère 
1960, 176). The executive committee for oceanography describes this puzzle in the 
Annals of the IGY: “It is well known that there are many kinds of surface oscillations 
longer than ordinary waves and shorter than the main tidal periods, but little is known 
about their propagation in deep water” (Laclavère 1960, 176). These waves were thought 
to be generated from weather events and pressure changes as well as seismic events, as in 
the case of tsunami waves, and studying them had potential impacts for weather 
forecasting, disaster planning, and coastal infrastructure (Deacon 1957).  
The two parts of the IGY oceanography program, ocean circulation and sea level 
and long wave recording, entailed two very different sets of methodologies, which 
enrolled different actors and had different sets of challenges (see also Hamblin 2005). 
The program to study ocean circulation consisted almost entirely of measurements taken 
during highly coordinated oceanographic research cruises. At “intervals during the course 
of a voyage,” measurements were taken, most frequently “those termed ‘serial 
observations,’ which provide data on a variety of elements (temperature, salinity, 
dissolved gases, and others) at different levels between the surface and the bottom of the 
sea” (Lumby 1960, 1). Measurements and observations on a number of other topics were 
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also recorded on these cruises, including water color and transparency, “state of the sea 
and swell,” bathymetry, and biology (Special Committee for the IGY 1959, 298). Two 
new technologies also aided the study of ocean circulation. The bathythermograph 
(Figure 2), developed in the US to aid in WWII submarine warfare, allowed 
measurements of temperature variation with depth to be easily taken from moving ships 
(see Oreskes 2000 for a detailed analysis of the politics of bathythermograph 
measurements). 
Another important technology was the neutrally buoyant float, invented in the 
UK, which allowed for currents to be tracked at different depths (Figure 3). The floats 
were designed to sink to certain depths and contained a sonar ‘ping’ that could be 
detected from listening ships on the surface. These technologies, in addition to previously 
existing methods, allowed scientists to sample the sea at regular intervals and to generate 
an unprecedented amount of oceanographic data, even though most of the sea remained 
un-sampled. The coordinated nature of the cruises allowed, for example, for scientists to 
confirm the presence of a deep current below the Gulf Stream, running in the counter 
direction along North America’s East Coast. Furthermore, both the bathythermograph 
and the neutrally buoyant float have enduring legacies. While the bathythermograph is 
used today in a similar form, neutrally-buoyant floats have undergone several stages of 
innovation which now allow them to be highly programmable, to collect data such as 
temperature, salinity, and dissolved oxygen at various depths, and to be tracked via 
satellite (see also Author, 2016; 2017). They are a key synoptic technology of 
Anthropocene ocean knowledge. 
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  The reliance on oceanographic research cruises for the circulation studies of the 
IGY hence extended the tradition of blending oceanographic science with sea-faring 
adventure and exploration. The IGY study of ocean circulation was executed through a 
number of coordinated cruises carried out by 70 ships from 35 nations (Schlee 1973, 
346). Yet, the US and UK conducted the lion’s share, along with the USSR. Other 
wealthy nations with traditions of seafaring also participated, including Germany, France, 
and Norway. Navies still funded much of this research; in the US, the national committee 
for the IGY suggested that the Office for Naval Research (ONR) take control of the IGY 
program because “the ONR has had a long and successful history in organizing and 
managing an effective oceanographic program.”4 Participation in the IGY was a way for 
oceanographers in these military superpowers to show the relevance of their discipline 
beyond its wartime applications, thus ensuring continued governmental and public 
support. At the same time, oceanography continued to be highly relevant to imperial 
militaries, even as these forces were themselves adapting to the Cold War contexts. 
Fraser’s words exemplify the intersections between military and peacetime concerns in 
the nuclear era, expressed through marine materialities: 
“the age of the atomic energy power station is already upon us, and we must ask 
ourselves betimes whether it is really sensible to use the ocean floor as a dump for 
radio-active waste. If the turnover of the ocean waters is too slow, we may soon 
poison large areas of the sea; if fast enough, then the dispersion of the radio-active 
waste might be so complete as to be harmless, even in the face of the incredible 
power of living organisms to concentrate minute traces of rare elements in their 
own blood and tissue” (Fraser 1958,7; see also Hamblin 2005; 2006).  
                                                 
4 Minutes of Fifth Meeting, USNC Executive Committee March 8, 1955 Washington DC. 
In File: International Geophysical Year U.S. National Committee Meetings - 1955, 
National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
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Efforts to cement the centrality of oceanography to emerging national concerns were 
largely successful; following the IGY, both the US and UK saw significant investment in 
oceanography. This was evidenced most immediately in support for the Indian Ocean 
Expedition that immediately followed, and the International Decade of Ocean 
Exploration that began in 1969.  
While oceanography adopted a prominent position in the emerging Cold War 
context, its agents also inspired affective connections with older agents of empire: 
masculine sailors aboard long-distance vessels. Walter Sullivan, the New York Times full-
time reporter for the IGY, was quick to equate the physical presence of American 
scientists with their ability to make oceanographic knowledge, for example describing 
Roger Revelle as “an enormous man (6ft 4 in) who looks as if he were specially 
designed, both physically and temperamentally, to study the Pacific Ocean” (Sullivan 
1961, 346).  In fact, Sullivan’s words indicate the way that oceanographic cruises during 
the IGY carried on legacies of exploration and adventure, despite assertions of 
international cooperation and a new era of scientific exploration:   
"These men, accustomed to living with salt in their hair and their lives in 
jeopardy, typify oceanography as it was in the United States at the start of the 
IGY - a science pursued by barefoot youths in ragged shorts and greasy shirts on 
the wave-swept decks of sailing ships. What a contrast to the surroundings of 
other IGY explorers - the men on the launching pads at Cape Canaveral, or those 
with their instruments mounted in multi jet aircraft!” (Sullivan 1961, 346). 
This discussion of the ship-based ocean circulation research during the IGY provides 
some insight into how the long networks of oceanography as a planetary science built 
upon imperial legacies and geopolitical tensions to catalyze new ideas of the Earth as a 
planet. However, this account risks remaining focused on a few ships, a select number of 
scientists, and a set of key technological developments; the hallmarks of what Harris 
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(2011) characterizes as ‘small science’ analysis. Truly accounting for the synoptic 
relations of IGY oceanography entails examining the relations that are occluded in most 
accounts of oceanographic expeditions, which are only part of the distinctive, dispersed, 
and heterogeneous processes by which synoptic science gets made. For example, Oreskes 
(2000) has written about the gendered nature of oceanographic labor during the post-war 
period, analyzing the crucial yet underrecognized women’s work of compiling 
bathythermograph records. In addition to women data-processors, attention is due to the 
perhaps less exciting work of recording sea levels and long waves, to which I now turn in 
greater detail. Because the long wave study involved new research, while the sea level 
studies primarily involved the coordination of routinely captured data, I focus on the 
former here. This crucial work was not performed by prestigious scientists working from 
centers of expertise but by technicians, natural resource managers, lighthouse keepers, 
and others on remote islands and colonial coasts.  
LONG WAVE RECORDERS AND IGY GLOBALITY  
The technologies by which long waves were recorded during the IGY provide an entry 
point into the midcentury politics of synoptic oceanography. Rather than being measured 
using instruments deployed from ships on high-seas missions, sea level and long waves 
were mostly measured using gauges or recorders installed in ports, on reefs, or on other 
coastal infrastructures. Recording long waves, in particular, presented some challenges. 
Ideally, long wave recorders should be set up away from the influence of coasts and 
coastal infrastructures, which interfere with the propagation and travel of the waves (Van 
Dorn and Donn 1969). Yet, the recorders of the 1950s (seen in Figure 4) needed to be 
attached to rigid frames (contemporary versions are now usually attached to buoys, or 
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measure pressure and depth variations in the water column from the sea floor). Therefore, 
IGY scientists determined that “the most practical compromise so far employed is the 
installation of special recorders on small, isolated Pacific Islands, with the detector 
located on a steep offshore slope” (Van Dorn and Donn 1969, 47). 
By locating wave recorders on remote islands, the IGY enrolled a set of actors 
distinct from the intrepid high-seas scientists from major research centers. The labor of 
local technicians and resource managers was required to keep the gauges in working 
order as well as to collect and report the data; for example, South Africa’s IGY plans 
included the suggestion that “the light house keepers at Dassen and Bird Islands 
respectively be paid an honorarium of 5 pounds per month […] to look after the 
equipment after it had been installed and to change the recorder paper, etc.”5 Not only 
were places that previously had little contact with imperial oceanography included; they 
were specifically targeted: “Cooperation [was] solicited from countries bordering on 
oceanic areas where specific gaps existed in the network of stations previously proposed, 
such as, the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans” (Van Dorn and Donn 1969, 49). 
Discussion of the wave recorder and sea level programs of the IGY break with the 
usual narrative tropes of IGY reporting and provide a rare opportunity to view the IGY as 
something other than an unqualified success. Though it is still steeped in pervasive IGY 
optimism, one report on the long wave recorder program does more than hint at trouble: 
                                                 
5 Program Report, South Africa National Committee for the International Geophysical 
Year 1957-58, Third Assembly of the Special Committee for the International 
Geophysical Year (CSAGI) 1957-1958, Brussels, September 1955. In RG 59 General 
Records of the Department of State, Records Relating to International Conferences, 
1949-1958, and to the International Geophysical Year 1954-1958 (Multiple Lots) (Lot) 
61D333 S/Sa Box 9 NN3-89-15, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
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“It is doubtful whether the study of long waves is entirely successful. It is a new venture 
and there was insufficient time to gain experience with the apparatus designed for the 
purpose” (Laclavère 1960, 177). It is difficult to obtain information on the day-to-day 
work of the long wave and sea level programs; human operators of the wave recorders 
are rarely mentioned in IGY primary documents or the scientific articles that resulted. 
But some statements indicate that not all went smoothly; for example, Van Dorn, the 
inventor of the most prominent IGY long wave recorder, wrote that the instruments were 
“susceptible to storm damage and local vandalism” (Van Dorn 1960, 1012). 
 Why would local residents vandalize long wave recorders? Justification for this 
statement is lacking here, but we can imagine why tensions might exist. The imperial 
legacies of oceanography are not limited to the trope of adventuring sailor. The recording 
of long waves is also directly tied to US imperialism, albeit in more modern forms. The 
first long wave recorders were established near the Scripps Institute for Oceanography in 
La Jolla, CA in 1947 and 1948. However, their development was slow and “analysis of 
these records failed to produce any consistent cause and effect relationship” (Van Dorn 
and Donn 1969, 48).  Then, in 1952, oceanographers were invited to make long wave 
measurements during the US’s first thermo-nuclear weapons test in the Bikini Atoll.  
The recorders used during this expedition were “hastily improvised and crudely 
designed,” but opportunities to improve them were proffered by more nuclear tests in 
1954 and 1956, leading the developers of the recording device used during IGY to 
conclude that “while most of these studies remain unclassified, it can be stated that 
coherent crest arrivals were observed at all stations, and consistent empirical relationships 
have been derived from these data which have materially improved our understanding of 
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the generation and propagation of long waves in the open sea” (Van Dorn and Donn 
1960, 49). The US Pacific nuclear tests did not simply provide an invaluable opportunity 
for the testing and development of technologies. They also informed the scientists’ 
decision to install the long wave recorders on isolated Pacific islands, chosen ostensibly 
because of the high incidence of tsunamis nearby but surely aided by the scientists’ past 
experience in the region.  
 The IGY long wave program followed closely in the footsteps of the nuclear tests. 
Again, oceanographers from SIO developed instruments to be used (manufactured by 
Non-Linear Systems in nearby Del Mar, CA), and “personally visited Chile, Peru, New 
Zealand, Tahiti, and Japan to instruct local scientists in the operation of the instruments 
and, where possible, to assist them in site location and installation” (Van Dorn and Donn 
1969, 49). US IGY long wave stations were also located on Pacific islands (Wake, 
Johnston, Canton) that were administered by the US Department of Defense (and some 
continue to host military installations and their toxic legacies) (Van Dorn and Donn, 
1969). Sometimes local fisheries managers, light house keepers, and others managed long 
wave and sea level data collection, but at other times these roles were executed under the 
purview of the US military.  
 The design of the long wave and sea level programs, their associated 
technologies, and their roots in nuclear experimentation introduce networks of relation 
that emphasis on the ship-based study of ocean circulation misses. The legacy of long 
wave recorders in nuclear experimentation indicates another globality that is indelibly 
entangled with the IGY’s storied globality of international cooperation, scientific 
diplomacy, and collaborative quest to solve the planet’s mysteries. As several have 
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argued, a globality of nuclearism underlies a globality of international unity; perhaps in 
fact “the planetary extent of this militarized radiation inspired the modern concept of 
globalism itself” (Deloughrey 2012, 168). Deloughrey argues that the myth of island 
isolation resides at the heart of Cold War science, linking the atom bomb tests with the 
emergent study of ecosystems (another key component of Anthropocene knowledge). 
The connection between nuclear testing and long wave recorders, and their installment on 
‘isolated’ islands during the IGY, shows similar dynamics. On one hand, the isolation of 
the islands was understood as important for studying long waves unfettered by the 
influence of other landmasses. On the other hand, the long wave program was designed to 
reduce the islands’ isolation, bringing them into networks of measurement by both 
covering previous gaps in global measurements and establishing new research stations by 
installing equipment and training local technicians. Thus, attention to the synoptic 
geographies of the IGY oceanography program reveals how contemporary 
understandings of the ocean as a planetary entity emerged from and contributed to the 
complex networks of experimentation, nuclearism, militarism, and resistance that 
continue to shape the Pacific (see for example Davis 2014). More broadly, in making 
global knowledge about the propagation of long waves in the sea, the IGY’s 
oceanography program knitted together old and new forms of imperialism in constructing 
the world ocean as an object of knowledge in a new era of planet-scale environmental 
politics.  
CONCLUSION: SYNOPTIC GEOGRAPHIES AND THE ANTHROPOCENE 
CRITIQUE 
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This paper has both argued for the development of a geographic analytic of synoptic 
geographies, and, through an exploration of the IGY oceanography program, 
demonstrated what such an analytic might reveal. Synoptic geographies create certain 
visions of the planet; visions that are not strictly views from above nor from below; 
neither from nowhere nor everywhere. Moreover, synoptic geographies are inductive 
practices rather than conceptual abstractions. Synoptic geographies, through a set of 
emplaced measurements coordinated across time and space, bring into view the very 
‘nature’ that provides and defines the conditions of possibility for Anthropocene 
environmental politics. It is only through these practices that we are able to understand 
the Earth as a planet, and understand its capacities for change as governed by planetary-
scale systems dynamics. As world-making practices, synoptic geographies also elevate 
certain places, in this case remote Pacific islands, to global status (Camprubí 2018). A 
critical analysis of synoptic geographies shows that Anthropocene knowledge is not just 
located in the meetings of the International Stratigraphic Society. And yet, as this 
analysis has shown, what synoptic geographies hide from view is just as important as 
what they reveal. Read uncritically, in producing a planetary nature that is cohesive, self-
regulated, and totalizing, synoptic geographies “occlude [their] infrastructural history and 
conditions of possibility” (Helmreich 2011, 1211). As the case of global oceanography 
shows, in obscuring the social and material infrastructures that make planetary views 
possible, synoptic geographies hide the international division of scientific labor, and 
moreover, the ways in which planetary knowledge is intertwined with the dynamics of 
imperialism. Synoptic geographies also hide the contingency of their planetary views. A 
geographic analytic shows that notions of the Earth as a planet upon which the 
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Anthropocene depends are self-evident reflections of reality but emerge only out of a set 
of geopolitical and technical relations. While it may not be revelatory to state that the 
Earth of the Anthropocene is a distinctly social entity, this exploration of the IGY shows 
that this declaration is insufficient on its own. Rather, to fully account for difference and 
violence in the Anthropocene we must pay close attention to the particular synoptic 
geographies through which the Anthropocene Earth (and ocean) have come to be known.  
 In his analysis of the synoptic geographies of climate modeling, Edwards details 
what he calls metadata friction: “the labor of recovering data’s context of creation, 
restoring the memory of how those numbers were made” (2010, 432). Grappling with 
metadata friction is one of the necessary tasks for scientists to learn new things from old 
data, something they must continue to pursue if they wish to understand how the climate 
is changing over time. Geographers who engage with the environmental politics of the 
Anthropocene have their own metadata friction to contend with, regarding the ways in 
which planetary environments have come to be understood. Considering synoptic 
geographies from this standpoint, we might not only learn from the data they produced 
but also learn how to be socially and politically accountable to and for the worlds that 
their praxis has created.  
 To take this assertion further, if scientists must contend with metadata friction in 
order to make reliable knowledge, then for geographers this pursuit is not simply about 
the ability to create facts but to fully elaborate the justice dimensions of the 
Anthropocene critique. Although it has generated a great deal of literature, the 
Anthropocene is still a new concept. It is not only new but also extremely broad in scope 
and in potential for unsettling thought (and perhaps, ultimately, politics). As such, the 
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geographic critique of the Anthropocene is still being worked out. While it seems that 
this critique must necessarily be concerned with justice and difference, so far this effort 
has been incomplete. To use broad strokes: efforts to think difference, violence and 
inequality have focused on the creation of the conditions of the Anthropocene on one 
hand and its effects on the other. By now it is widely acknowledged that the 
Anthropocene was born out of the violences of slavery, colonization, dispossession, and 
imperialism, regardless of the start date hypothesis to which one ascribes (see for 
example Moore 2017 on the Capitalocene; Haraway 2015 on the Plantationocene; and 
Vergès 2017 on the Racial Capitalocene). Another body of scholarship, too large to cite 
fully here, focuses on the unequal impacts of environmental degradation and climate 
change; tying these two bodies of scholarship together, perhaps, is the adage that those 
who have contributed the least to climate change and other environmental woes will bear 
the brunt of these effects.  
 While these arguments are absolutely vital, this paper locates another source for 
an emerging justice critique of the Anthropocene: the scientific knowledge processes 
upon which ideas of the Anthropocene depend. For example, Ghosh (2016) has argued 
that imperialism was just as influential as capitalism in determining the conditions of the 
Anthropocene. My exploration of the IGY’s oceanography program shows that 
imperialism has also shaped the ways in which Anthropocene natures have come to be 
known. By studying synoptic geographies as globally-coordinated situated practices, we 
can see how the emergence of the planetary as an object of knowledge depends on 
imperial networks refracted through the politics of the Cold War. Thus certain places, 
people, and practices become evident as sites for further critique of (in)justice in the 
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Anthropocene. It is not enough to simply say that synoptic science is composed of 
complex relations, nor that global knowledge elides difference in the production of 
powerful universalisms. Rather, synoptic geographies compel us to deeper 
understandings of how complexities and differences matter, impacting how problems and 
possibilities are framed in contemporary environmental politics. Ultimately, it is nature 
itself that is at stake in these epistemologies of the Anthropocene. The world we have to 
work on, to live in, to be responsible for, can and should only be understood as a product 
of the relations that make it legible.  
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Figure captions: 
Fig. 1. Joseph Kaplan, chairman of the US National Committee for the IGY, looks at a 
transparent globe of the planet and its surrounds. Source: Special Packet: The United 
States and the International Geophysical Year, U.S. Information Agency, 1957. National 
Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
 
Fig. 2.  A scientist prepares to deploy a bathythermograph during the IGY. Source: 
Odishaw, H. 1958. The International Geophysical Year. Science 288(3339):37. Image 
reproduced with permission.  
 
Fig. 3.  John Swallow works on the neutrally-buoyant float that he is credited with 
inventing shortly before the start of the IGY. Source: National Oceanographic Library, 
Archives. National Oceanography Centre, Southampton. Image reproduced with 
permission. 
 
Fig. 4. A Van Dorn long wave recorder, a slight variation on the main design used during 
the IGY. Source: Van Dorn, W. 1960. A New Long-Period Wave Recorder. Journal of 
Geophysical Research 65(3):1010. Image reproduced with permission.  
